Tony,
you did a lot of research of participation of the United Kingdom in the NATO
structures. Could you comment on what led Cameron administrative to strong
response towards Libya? Was it the strong voice of France?
I think that a lot of factors lined up at the right
time – the revulsion at Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people, the request for
assistance from the Arab League and from the Libyan opposition, the optimism of
the ‘Arab Spring’, the view that something that would make a difference could
be done reasonably easily and inexpensively, the support of the US. France’s readiness to intervene was probably
also a factor – the UK and France have recently signed a broad defence
agreement and defence cooperation between the two nations is close – but it
would not have been the only one.
How has the
British society perceive the no-flight zone over Libya and ongoing operations?
I should say first of all that I have not lived in the
UK for almost 10 years, so I cannot claim to be very in touch with perceptions
there.
But as I understand it, support is slipping away with
more people now against the UK’s participation than in favour of it. I would imagine that after more than two
months of military operations with apparently little effect and Gaddafi still
clinging to power, people are beginning to wonder where this will lead, and to worry
that UK forces will be drawn into another extended commitment – UK’s
participation in the war in Afghanistan is opposed by something like a 2-1
majority amongst the UK public.
You also worked as a researcher in the field of ballistic missile defence
at the British Embassy to the USA in Washington DC. Could you analyze what made
Barrack Obama call off the SDI?
To clarify, Barack Obama did not call off the ‘SDI’. Successive US administrations have reshaped
the missile defence programme over the years, with Republican administrations
tending to be more enthusiastic for it than Democratic ones. The programme continues under Obama and still
attracts substantial funding, but its focus has shifted away from systems that
deal with intercontinental ballistic missile threats (although there is still a
good deal of research, testing and capability enhancement of these systems) and
more towards systems to deal with shorter range threats. As part of this realignment, the
administration decided not to proceed with the installations in Poland and the
Czech Republic.
There are probably several reasons behind this. Firstly, the administration has argued that
long range threats have not yet emerged as had been feared, but that shorter
range threats have grown rapidly and pose risks to US (and Allied) forces.
Secondly, in refocusing on theatre defences and a
phased approach to the defence of populations and territories, both of which
are dealt with through NATO programmes, Obama has chosen a more multilateral approach
to missile defence, and distanced himself from the Bush administration’s
bilateralism.
Thirdly, Russia has been strongly opposed to strategic
missile defence. It would be too much to
suggest that the administration has bowed to Russia’s demands. But there can be no doubt that reducing the
emphasis on defence against longer range threats has been a positive factor in
Obama’s wider strategic goals of a ‘reset’ with Russia and a re-invigoration of
the arms control agenda.
Fourthly, missile defence is an expensive endeavour –
in 2009, 18 of the Allies spent less on defence in total than the US spent on
missile defence alone. It makes sense to
scale back some of the longer term elements of the programme – such as the
airborne laser and space-based interceptor – in times of economic difficulty.
How did you
value the SDI overall? Could you comment on geostrategic background of such
iniciative?
The strategic ballistic missile defence systems in
place today are designed to deal with a limited attack only – a handful of incoming
missiles – so they are aimed at deterring, or countering attacks from, ‘rogue actors’,
not large states with substantial arsenals of ballistic missiles. The American-Russian strategic balance is
almost entirely unaffected by the US missile defence programme - although Russia
seems determined not to accept this.
So how likely is it that a rogue actor would attempt a
ballistic missile attack on the US, and how likely is it that such an actor
would be deterred by the presence of a missile defence system? Of course, we can never know, but it seems
that a rogue actor would have to be very desperate to consider a ballistic
missile attack. Ballistic missiles are
technologically highly complex and their use would invite instant retaliation –
there are easier and more reliable means to deliver a mass effect attack. On the other hand, the consequences of such
an attack would be devastating. In the
end, there is no such thing as a perfect defence - defence planning is about
judging risks and evaluating the costs of mitigating those risks. The US apparently judges that it is worth
spending large amounts of defence dollars to deal with the risk of a ballistic
missile attack.
NATO has
brought up a new strategic concept in Lisbon last fall. Could you give us an
analysis of changes and your expectations?
On the whole, I think that the Alliance did a good job
with the new Strategic Concept. It sets
out in a clear and straightforward way what the Alliance is about. It reaffirms the commitment to collective
defence and NATO’s continuing role in crisis management and cooperative
security. Inevitably, it is not very
specific, but it contains some clear principles to guide decision making in the
years to follow.
But it is an ambitious agenda. In that respect, one of the key sections
comes near the end, when the Allies outline their determination to plan better
and to work together in order to develop the more usable armed forces they need
to carry out the tasks they have agreed.
Looking back over the 12 years since the last strategic concept, the
Allies have not been very effective in reforming their forces. With this
record, and the likelihood of many years of austerity ahead of us, we might
wonder whether NATO will be able to deliver all that it wishes.
Since you
live in Estonia, could you describe our readers how is the relation of Baltic
countries to contemporary Russia?
At the moment, the relationship is quiet – which is
about as good as it gets. Undoubtedly,
the three states would welcome better relations with Russia, but the prospects
for this are not good, as long as Russia continues to see foreign policy as a
zero-sum game for large players, with states like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
as, at best, irrelevant. So the Balts
are wary – and there is plenty to be wary about. Russia continues to use every opportunity to
allege that the human rights of Russians living in the three states are being
infringed. It has a ‘compatriots policy’
which encourages the idea that a part of the Baltic population belongs in some
unspecified way more to Russia than it does to its countries of residence. It tries to divide NATO and the EU, it
threatens energy supply, it misuses history.
And more fundamentally, the Balts, like any other
western state, struggle to deal with a Russia that is non-democratic, chaotic
and in which business ventures are precarious.
Since you
are personally connected to Estonia, would you tell us your remarks about
possible NATO enlargement to Georgia?
The Allies have to decide,
unanimously, that any state that wishes to join NATO should be allowed to do so. NATO has agreed that Georgia will become a
member in the future, but even its strongest supporters seem to agree that it
has a long way to go before it can meet the requirements that NATO has
established for membership. The question
for NATO at the moment is how far it should go to help Georgia meet these
requirements. Many Allies have bilateral
assistance programmes, but granting Georgia MAP status – which NATO decided not
to do at its Bucharest Summit – would have reinforced Georgia’s membership
prospects and sent a helpful signal. This
was a missed opportunity.
Beyond this more technical issue,
however, it is a key point of principle that every state should be able to
choose its own security arrangements. No
party outside the Alliance should be allowed to veto or influence its decisions
over enlargement – NATO itself is clear on this point. In this regard, it is unfortunate that some
Allies oppose MAP status for Georgia on the grounds that NATO should not
jeopardise its efforts to pursue closer cooperation with Russia. This self-censorship is a betrayal of NATO’s
own principles and might be seen as a tacit acknowledgment that Russia’s
concerns over NATO enlargement have some legitimacy. It should not be used as an argument against
further enlargement.
Thank you
for your time.
Jakub Janda
Prepared for onwar.eu
--
Tony Lawrence
is a senior researcher at the International Centre for Defence Studies, in
Tallinn, Estonia, where he is responsible for the Centre’s Defence and Force
Planning Project. He is also a member of the Directing Staff of the
Higher Command Studies Course at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia.
