Interview with a Czech-born professor of history and international relations from Boston University about Republican Primaries, role of foreign policy in campaigns and the European confusion about the Republican and Democrats as well as about Russian latest elections, a mammoth internal debt to its citizens, and Nordstream and Russian radar station in Kaliningrad.
President Barack Obama has introduced a major doctrinal shift, one towards the Pacific Region and Asia, expecting China to claim a superpower status. Could you comment?
Washington has merely acknowledged the reality of the changing international scene as it noted that the center of gravity has been since the late 1970s moving away from the Atlantic toward the Pacific. China and India have now joined Japan in forming a powerful triangle that may have already surpassed in importance that of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. It is noteworthy that Russia, a country that has been reduced to selling its natural resources, may no longer enjoy a superpower status. Its rise and fall are the most dramatic themes of the postwar era.
Could you compare foreign policy of the last three years by Barack Obama to the eight-year period of George W. Bush? Has Obama really changed it?
President Bush asserted that the so-called war on terror defined his presidency. He spoke of himself as a “wartime president” and America was, in his view, a “nation at war.” I hoped that Obama would refocus American priorities, and he encouraged such hopes. As a candidate, he marveled that although the Nazis had committed crimes no one had seen before, “we still gave them a day in court, and that taught the entire world about who we are but also the basic principles of rule of law.” I believed Obama when he promised to shut down Guantanamo, to abolish the Military Commissions, and to withdraw from Iraq. I am sympathetic that his political enemies made it very hard for him to achieve such objectives but he should have been more assertive and forceful.
In American eyes, is a departure from Iraq and a successful campaign by NATO over Libya considered a president’s win?
The American public paid no attention to Libya and it won’t play any role in the campaign. As to Iraq, his enemies will blame Obama for the violence that is bound to escalate now that the U.S. troops have left, while his supporters will blame him for not having left earlier.
The Republican Primary Elections have made some splash in the field of projecting the US foreign policy. Some say that the indulgence of several candidates shows how foreign policy has not been the turning point winning Presidential Election since the end of Cold War. Is it, in your opinion, a real trend that candidates know a very little about foreign policy and their advisers work on such issue later in the contest?
Except at a time of war, foreign policy was hardly ever at the center of presidential campaigns in this country. This was certainly true throughout much of the postwar era. Americans understand that a sophisticated understanding of foreign policy is not a precondition of a successful presidency in the United States. For instance, Ronald Reagan who is said to have triumphed in the foreign policy arena, had but a rudimentary understanding of it. He acted on instinct and intuition. He sought to promote the values that he held dear and resisted what he considered despicable. Such a solid foundation is more useful to a president than being able to name all the members of the Chinese politburo. Of course, ignorance is never good.
One of the Republican candidates, Ron Paul, has expressed his view that interventionism including wars abroad are not to stay in the national doctrine. Looking back to American history – do you perceive involvement of the US Army abroad as an exception of American foreign policy?
The American public paid no attention to Libya and it won’t play any role in the campaign. As to Iraq, his enemies will blame Obama for the violence that is bound to escalate now that the U.S. troops have left, while his supporters will blame him for not having left earlier.
The Republican Primary Elections have made some splash in the field of projecting the US foreign policy. Some say that the indulgence of several candidates shows how foreign policy has not been the turning point winning Presidential Election since the end of Cold War. Is it, in your opinion, a real trend that candidates know a very little about foreign policy and their advisers work on such issue later in the contest?
Except at a time of war, foreign policy was hardly ever at the center of presidential campaigns in this country. This was certainly true throughout much of the postwar era. Americans understand that a sophisticated understanding of foreign policy is not a precondition of a successful presidency in the United States. For instance, Ronald Reagan who is said to have triumphed in the foreign policy arena, had but a rudimentary understanding of it. He acted on instinct and intuition. He sought to promote the values that he held dear and resisted what he considered despicable. Such a solid foundation is more useful to a president than being able to name all the members of the Chinese politburo. Of course, ignorance is never good.
One of the Republican candidates, Ron Paul, has expressed his view that interventionism including wars abroad are not to stay in the national doctrine. Looking back to American history – do you perceive involvement of the US Army abroad as an exception of American foreign policy?
The Founding Fathers of this country were careful to note that America’s heart would always be on the side of liberty, but she would not sail overseas in search of causes, no matter how great, for which to fight. After all, many Europeans came to the United States to escape the militarism of Europe and its endless wars. In the aftermath of World War I, many Americans recoiled in horror from the senselessness of it, even rejecting the League of Nations in the process.The United States reacted differently after the end of World War II because of the aggressive nature of Stalinism. It was necessary to stay in Europe physically to protect at least some watered-down version of the status of Berlin and other such icons of the Cold War. Now, after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there’s no justification why the U.S. military budget should be as big as the sum of the military budgets of the rest of the world. The present situation is untenable: although the U.S. gets only twenty percent of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the whole world expects the U.S. Navy to protect it from Iran. Where’s the U.K., Japan, France? The one overseas American military mission that must remain is in Korea, although China and other countries in the region should play a more active role in managing the North Koreans.
If a Republican wins the Presidential Election this November, will the EU feel it in international relations since January 2013?
I don’t believe that there’s much of a difference between a Democratic or Republican president’s attitude toward Europe. All presidents swear to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” In doing so, they accept the task of promoting American interests, not Republican or Democratic interests. Consequently, they tend to act abroad alike.
What is, in your experience, a trend regarding foreign policy topics in the campaigns? Does some kind of narrow-minded labeling during tough campaign fight effect future President in his decisions?
Do tough campaigns form presidents? All campaigns for the White House are tough, extremely so, and they are bound to leave traces on the minds of those who fought them. But people at the top are tougher than the campaigns. They are able to form alliances with their former enemies. Think about Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush or Barrack Obama and Hillary Clinton! Normal people would be unable to be in the same room after the blistering Reagan vs. Bush or Obama vs. Clinton campaigns, but they chose to work together.
Generally, does Europe understand American Primaries?
Obviously, some have a remarkably deep understanding of the primaries but others adhere to a simplistic view of the American political scene. Political parties in this country are much less structured and disciplined than those in Europe. In fact, it’s impossible to join a party the way one does it in Europe. Here one simply declares oneself at an election time as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent, and there are no membership fees or orders how to vote.
Finally, some Europeans see Republicans as being “right“ and Democrats as “left.“ The truth is that there isn’t a homogeneous Republican or Democratic party in the United States. Republicans in Massachusetts are typically much less conservative that Democrats in Mississippi. One of my own senators is a Republican who took the seat of Ted Kennedy, one of the most liberal members of Congress for decades, and I can’t tell the difference.
Igor Lukeš: “I’ve never believed in military cooperation between NATO and Russia.“
What is your view of what is going on in Russia after the Parliamentary Elections?There was a time when the Soviet Union was mysterious, or even impossible to understand; Kremlinologists were occasionally reduced to educated guessing. There is little mystery left in today’s Russia. What you see is what you get. Deprived of its Communist utopian fanaticism, the present ruling elite has no political formula to put forward, except for its own addiction to power and wealth. It is driven by a sense of entitlement and motivated by self-enrichment. Some may feel nostalgic for the former Soviet empire, but most have grown accustomed to their luxurious residences in London (aka Londongrad), clothes from Milan, and luxury cars from Germany. The recent elections were obviously fixed to maintain the Putin regime in power in perpetuity. It isn’t surprising that the likes of Putin wish to stay at the top. It’s shocking that so many regional officials have chosen – twenty years after the demise of the Soviet Union – to become co-conspirators in the scheme.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitrij Medvedev have officially announced their position swap so that Putin can get back as a Head of the State for indefinite period of time. There is almost nobody who would not call it a major breach of democratic principles. What is your take on the move?It is a breach of fundamental democratic principles.
Putin calls his regime an authoritative democracy. Looking back at the historical perspective – key attributes of the rulers in Kremlin have always been strength and power more than popularity among their folks. Is current Russian leader only a continuation of this trend – a new car?
Whenever one sees an adjective in front of “democracy,” one must be vigilant: remember “people’s democracy”! I recall that in 1929 King Alexander of Yugoslavia called his personal dictatorship was a “guided democracy.” The country’s collapse in 1941 and disintegration in the nineties should serve as a memento to the supporters of Putin’s “authoritative democracy.”
But as to your question, I hesitate to treat nations in a deterministic fashion. There was little in the Czech past to signal the rise of democracy in the interwar period. And who would have foreseen that the Czechs would love their Masaryk, would have the “show trials” of the late forties and early fifties, torture, and executions of political prisoners? Who would have guessed that the Chinese who gave the world the “cultural revolution” would one day live in skyscrapers and be the owners of the American national debt?
Therefore, I’m committed to the view that no nation is sentenced to live in one mode forever. Think of Nazi Germany! I’m certainly willing to believe that Russia can change.
Looking back – Russia saw a huge uprising in 1917 which became historically known as the Great October Socialistic Revolution. After manipulation of the recent elections by the state bodies there has been a first 50 000-head demonstration in Moscow since the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. Some commentators recall the very current stories of the Arab Spring – can you see any outrage having a real impact on the Russian contemporary politics?
In 1998, the total unpaid wage bill in Russia, i.e., money owed by the state to its citizens, amounted to c. $10 billion and affected about 70 percent of the workforce. It meant that some coal miners, teachers, oil workers, and police officers didn’t have enough money to buy food and they went to bed hungry. Yet, there were no strikes. This wasn’t a sign of Russia’s stability. It was a symptom of the nation’s clinical death. Therefore, I was delighted to see the streets of Moscow and other cities in Russia filled with protesting citizens. It is a testimony to the strength of Russia’s civil society.
The Putin regime is obviously frightened of this challenge. The new U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Michael McFaul, was in office for only two days when the state TV asserted that his job was to launch an anti-state revolution in Russia. It was a return, claimed the official TV, to the 18th century, when “an ambassador’s participation in intrigues and court conspiracies were ordinary business.” This is patently false. It’s a sign of panic in the Putin camp.
Barack Obama came to office in 2008 with a plan to restart US-Russia relations. He has signed a New START treaty with Medvedev in 2010, it is being said that this treaty is clearly an advantage and generous gesture towards Moscow. Has this geostrategically significant bipolar relationship anyhow developed after three years of Obama sitting in the Oval Office?
It “is being said?” By whom? The United States is not in the habit of signing treaties not to its advantage. It would be a crime for its negotiators to accept a draft of a treaty that provided unilateral advantages to the other side. No president could ratify such a document. Yet, the New START sailed through the Senate with a vote of 71 vs. 26, with 13 Republicans voting with the majority. That speaks for itself. I think we should abandon the notion that the treaty was an act of generosity toward Russia. It was an agreement that vastly simplified the management of nuclear arsenals on both sides, and, by providing for inspections, decreased the sense of insecurity that could lead to a catastrophic error.
Could you evaluate Russian position towards Kiev, when Ukraine experienced a magnificent turnaround after the Orange Revolution and acts like Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito?
Russia with Ukraine and Belarus is a significant world power. Russia on its own isn’t more important than Spain. This is what makes the ruling elite in Moscow determined to maintain the strongest possible ties with Kiev. The problem is that only the Western (mostly Catholic) Ukrainians oppose a de facto commonwealth with Russia, while the Eastern (and Orthodox) part of the country supports it. The Ukrainians must – without outside interference – first decide where they want to be: in Europe or Russia? Their answer will have immense consequences for the overall balance of power.
To what extent does Russian energy blackmailing influence current policies of EU countries? What is your point of view on Nordstream – a pipe line between Russia and Germany?
I fully understand that Sweden and Finland had reason to be concerned that fiber optic cables attached to the pipeline may be used for underwater spying and that the Russian Navy is likely to sail into their exclusive economic zone under the pretext of protecting the pipeline. I also grasp that a line from Vyborg to Greifwald may well invoke in some people’s minds, e.g., Radek Sikorski’s, the Stalin-Hitler Pact. I don’t share such concerns. By-passing Ukraine and Belarus will make energy supplies to Europe more reliable. Nordstream will allow Germany to achieve its goal of eliminating nuclear energy and it will further weave Russia into Western economic structures and increase its dependence on hard currency income from the EU. True, in a great crisis, Russia could conceivably turn off the flow and hurt Western economies, but how will it get by without the income?
As a part of restarting US-Russia relations, the world’s largest country was invited into the NATO Anti Ballistic Missile System at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Nowadays, no real cooperation is happening and, moreover, threatening moves have been played on the chessboard. Medvedev launched the new radar station near Kaliningrad and says the former superpower will relocate its nuclear arsenal near Polish boarders. What is your take on the historical perspective of tensions and détente fluctuations in the relation between the land addicted to gas and the West (EU and the US)?
I’ve never believed in the possibility of military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Let the Russians place their hardware where they want. It’s obsolete and most likely useless. Doesn’t Poland have a battery of Patriot missiles from the United States based in Morag? In that case, Russia’s radar station in Kaliningrad is a predictable response.
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Igor Lukeš is a Czech-born professor of international relations and history at Boston University, USA. He left Czechoslovakia in the 1970’s and got his education in the US - (BA/MA, PhDr, Charles University, Prague; MALD, PhD, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
He is a historian of Central Europe in the 20th century. He has written about Europe between the world wars and about contemporary developments in East Central Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. He has published extensively in various academic journals. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Professor Lukes has systematically worked in the newly opened archives in Prague. This work provided the foundation for his book ‚Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930′s'. Published by Oxford University Press in 1996, the book won the Boston Authors Club Award as well as the Kahn Award. He is also a co-author and/or co-editor of ‚The Munich Conference, 1938: Prelude to World War II‘ (1999), ‚Inside the Apparat: Perspectives on the Soviet Union‘ (1990) and 'Gorbachev’s USSR: A System in Crisis' (1990).
His work has won the support of various prestigious institutions, including the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC; IREX; and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has also been the recipient of a Fulbright Fellowship for research, and in 1997 he won the Metcalf Award for Excellence in Teaching at Boston University.
