An analysis of Russian current aggresive shift foreign policy. Why do Kremlin do that? How to persuade to step back, but forward - in a long term?
The Russian
position in the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical region was supposed to turn towards
careful cooperation by two major doctrinal shifts which have occurred recently.
Obama’s policy of restarting the US-Russian relations (including signing of the
START treaty, which is clearly a Kremlin win), and, opening the door to the East
by inviting the Russian side to the currently-being-developed missile defense
system of NATO, should have caused a contemporary form of détente of
post-bipolar aggrieving ex-superpower. Since reality is never wholly defined by
proclamations, it became obvious that 2011 marked a deterioration of Russian trust
towards Western structures.
When trying
to persuade somebody to significantly change his position, one must understand the
internal world of his counterpart. A new ruler, Vladimir Putin, has involuntarily
seen number of voting slips devoted to his party fall to 49.3% from 64.3% in
five years. Losing the constitutional majority in the State Duma might seem
like a game-changing deal, moreover, after the country has seen a near uprising
against state manipulation during parliamentary elections - a first 50 000
demonstration since the exitus of Soviet Union. Authoritative democracy, as Putin
recalls domestic imperial history lectures, looks reportedly to satisfy the
majority of Russian population. To be strong is not an asset but a must in the
land of Siberian bears, so it is considered an imperative for the ruler of
Kremlin to act with power. Or to appear (again) significant, at least, in the
eyes of his followers and once in four years - voters.
Since the
only instruments of superpower status left in the land of vodka are nuclear
weapons and gas-exporting pipes, it comes as no surprise that the official
doctrine of Russian military forces (signed by president Medvedev in February
2010 even before The Lisbon Summit of NATO which took part later that Fall)
considers NATO as an enemy.
The Bear is Afraid
To find a reason why Moscow is threatening Poland, and Europe in a broader
sense, is as simple as keeping an AK-47 Kalashnikov working – Putin feels
afraid, and secondarily, nostalgic of good old powerful times. Imagine sitting
at his office and watching NATO expansion to Baltic states, Ukraine turning
into a new version of Yugoslavia with inbetweener’s approach called titoism from
the West, China demanding space on the Eastern side, emancipating Turkey with
strong NATO background such as American presence in Middle to Far East from the
Southern side of its borders. These facts generate a simple feeling. The
country of world-size poets is being besieged.
Security
dilemma is what we call an outcoming action academically, in the real world the
military expenditures have nearly doubled[1] in
four years and caused the diplomatic offensive. As historical discourse – preliminary
bombardment as diplomatic tactics have been used by Kremlin rulers for ages.
The only two words Russians geostrategically truly understand are power and strength.
Why to Wake (Him)
Up
Here comes
the cutting argument which could lead Russia to the real cooperation with NATO
(and in overall view- the EU) and mitigate the extended discrepancy between
diplomatic paperwork and the human world.
The Russian
economy is poor, addicted to gas and has not made not a single innovation ever.
It is about time to make Russian top-notch representatives to wake up and admit
it. Recalling times of Ronald Reagan who used the SDI buildup to crash the
Soviet Union without firing a shot and therefore won militarily-threatening Cold
War with economic means can be nowadays be translated as an urgent call to
action. If Moscow stops taking NATO as an enemy, it can decrease its military
expenses and rebuild its domestic structure – a feat for which the country has
been longing for since the times of Peter the Great.
As the
amount of remaining commodities under Russian freezing soil will undoubtedly
decrease, the state will be forced by energy-security and demographic trends to
manage its significant relation towards its neighbouring superpower - emerging
China. Since the American post-WW II two-major-conflict doctrine has recently
been turned to the less expensive shift towards Asia and Pacific area, a close American
surveillance of the Chinese rise seems to be inevitable. The situation will
most likely not turn into armed conflict, denominations like an untold race or economic
contest hit the nail on the head. Kremlin will not play a key global role, in
any measure except of nuclear arsenal, so it can rather easily get shoulder to
shoulder with Europe as being closer to continental cultural sphere then in
comparison with Asia.
Recalling
the triangle policy of Henry Kissinger will not be enough for the Russian
elites to wake up to the real world, but the longer leaders in Moscow live in
their dreams and rich history the more powerful decay of the once
internationally strong nation.
